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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

V.

:

WILLIAM WILLEY, III,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No, 950644-CA

Priority 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and
possession of drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994), in the Seventh
Judicial District Court in and For San Juan County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that what started

as a routine traffic stop for an equipment violation, and hence a

seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted to a voluntary
encounter once the arresting officer issued a verbal warning to
the driver and the driver, rather than simply proceeding on his
way, decided to replace his burned out license plate light and
the officer assisted him by illuminating the area with his
flashlight while the driver attempted to change the bulb?
The trial court's determination that the seizure reverted to
a voluntary encounter is most aptly described as a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness.

However, because of its

highly fact sensitive nature, the trial court's determination
should be afforded some discretion.

See generally State v. Pena.

869 P.2d 932, 935-939 (Utah 1994) (explaining analytical approach
for determining what standard of review and measure of discretion
should be afforded trial court determinations of fact sensitive
legal conclusions).
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that the

arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the vehicle
in which defendant was a passenger may have contained open
containers of alcohol where the officer smelled the odor of
alcohol on the breath of the driver, saw an open "12-pack" of
beer from which several containers were missing, and both the
open 12-pack and a cooler were in the passenger compartment
within reach of the driver and his passenger?

2

This Court reviews Ma trial court's determination of whether
a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of
discretion to the trial court."

State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220,

225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted).
3.

Did the trial court properly determine that defendant

was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he voluntarily
elected to drive his friend's vehicle to the sheriff's office and
receive his citation for possession of drug paraphernalia there
instead of receiving his citation at the scene of the initial
stop and requiring the officer to have the vehicle towed and
impounded?
The trial court's custody determination should be treated as
a question of law that, though reviewed nondeferentially, is
nonetheless afforded a measure of discretion.

See generally

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-939 (Utah 1994) (explaining
analytical approach for determining what standard of review and
measure of discretion should be afforded trial court
determinations of fact sensitive legal conclusions).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
3

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and possession of
drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 4-6). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress evidence that was seized by police during a
warrantless search of the vehicle in which defendant was a
passenger (R. 10-11).

The trial court denied that motion (R. 78-

83), and defendant entered conditional pleas of guilty under
which he reserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion
to suppress on appeal (R. 17-18, 83, 93, 98).x (A copy of the
trial court's findings, which were made from the bench, are
attached hereto as addendum A.)
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
The facts recited below are drawn from the transcript of the
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress and are recited in the

1

Because this case involves an appeal from misdemeanor
convictions, it would normally be prosecuted by the appropriate
county attorney, in this case, the San Juan County Attorney. The
Attorney General's Office agreed to prosecute the appeal because
it was already prosecuting the appeal from co-defendant
Patefield's felony drug possession conviction, State v.
Patefield, No. 950736-CA, in which Patefield raises two of the
three issues presented herein.
4

light most favorable to the trial court's findings.

State v.

Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1996); State v. Delaney.
869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994).
On the night of April 28, 1995, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
Rick Eldredge saw an older model Volkswagen van traveling on SR191 north of Monticello, Utah.

It was dark at the time, and

Eldredge noticed that the license plate light was burned out.
The trooper decided to stop the vehicle to issue a verbal warning
for failure to have the rear license plate illuminated as
required under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 21-23).
Upon stopping the vehicle, Eldredge asked the driver for
identification.

The driver produced a driver's license that

indicated he was Michael Patefield.

Eldredge told Patefield that

he stopped him because his license plate light was burned out,
issued a verbal warning for failure to have a properly
illuminated license plate, and told Patefield to uget it fixed"
(R. 23, 34). 2
Patefield explained that he had recently fixed the light and
asked if he could get out and fix it again.

Eldredge agreed that

he could, and the passenger, defendant William Willey, retrieved
a light bulb from glove box and handed it to Patefield (R. 23,

2

It was undisputed that Eldredge had by then returned
Patefield's driver's license and that Eldredge did not run either
a license or warrants check (R. 45).
5

34).
Patefield and Eldredge walked to the rear of the vehicle,
and Eldredge held his flashlight so that Patefield could see
better as he tried to replace the burned out bulb (R. 23, 35).
Patefield was unable to replace the bulb and decided to get some
tools out of the van.

Eldredge followed Patefield as he went

around the passenger side of the van, opened the sliding door
just behind the front passenger seat and pulled out a red tool
box (R. 23-4) . Eldredge could see inside the van as he watched
Patefield gather the tools he needed to fix the light. Among
other things, Eldredge saw a lot of food, backpacks, clothes and
coolers, which led him to conclude that the two men were going
camping (R. 24, 39).
Eldredge also saw several "12-packs'' of beer next to the
sliding door.

One of the 12-packs had been opened, and it

appeared that about half of the containers were gone.

Once

Patefield had the tools he needed, and he and Eldredge again
moved to the rear of the vehicle so that Patefield could fix the
light (R. 23-24) .
As Patefield tried to fix the light, he and Eldredge visited
about where Patefield and defendant had been and where they were
going (R. 24). Specifically, Patefield said that he and
defendant were on their way to Lake Powell for a camping trip (R.
35) .
6

During their conversation, Eldredge smelled the odor of
alcohol on Patefield's breath.

He let Patefield try to fix the

light, but Patefield was again unable to do so.

Eldredge

eventually told him that they could "fix it later" (R. 25).
Eldredge told Patefield he was concerned about the odor of
alcohol on Patefield's breath and the open box of beer in the
van.

He then asked Patefield if he had been drinking, and

Patefield said that he had beer for dinner two or three hours
earlier (R. 25). Eldredge told Patefield that he would like
check inside the van to make sure there were no open containers
of alcohol in the vehicle (R. 25).
Patefield went to the front of the van and told defendant
that "the officer wanted to look for open containers" and asked
defendant to "please get out" (R. 25). Defendant got out of the
van and brought with him a dog that had been sitting on the back
seat at the rear of the van.

Defendant took the dog to the side

of the road and waited with Patefield while Eldredge looked in
the van (R. 25).
The sliding door was still open, and Eldredge leaned across
the coolers and clothes so that he could look directly behind the
driver's seat.

There was a pile of coats or blankets behind the

driver's seat, and Eldredge lifted them up to make sure that no
open containers had been hidden beneath them (R. 25).

7

As Eldredge leaned into the van, he could smell the odor of
burnt marijuana coming from one or two "fanny packs'' that were
laying in the center of the van on top of the food and clothing
(R. 25). The packs were "right in front of [Eldredge7s] face,
probably six inches from [his] face" (R. 26) . Eldredge backed
up, looked at Patefield and said, "I can smell marijuana in one
or both of th[ose] fanny packs" (R. 26). When Eldredge said he
did not know exactly which one the smell was coming from,
Patefield, "without saying a word, . . . reached in, grabbed one
of the fanny packs, zipped it open, [and] handed [Eldredge] a
marijuana pipe" (R. 26).
Eldredge looked at the pipe and took the fanny pack away
from Patefield.

The trooper opened the fanny pack further and

saw that it contained several film canisters.

Patefield grabbed

one of the canisters and held it behind his back.

Eldredge stuck

out his hand and instructed Patefield to give him the canister.
Patefield responded, "[n]o.

I'll be in a lot of trouble for this

one" (R. 26). Eldredge told Patefield that he was already in
trouble, and Patefield acted like he was going to throw the
canister (R. 26).
As Patefield turned, apparently to ready himself to throw
the canister, Eldredge grabbed him by the arm and pushed him into
the van and onto the passenger seat.

Eldredge "snatched" the

canister away from Patefield, turned him around and handcuffed
8

him (R. 26) . Eldredge opened the canister and saw that it
contained what he believed to be LSD (R. 27) .
Eldredge took Patefield back to his patrol car, apprised him
of his rights under Miranda, and asked Patefield if he understood
his rights.

Patefield said, My]es," and Eldredge asked him if

he would speak to him without having an attorney present (R. 27).
Patefield answered, Mi]t depends on what the question is[,]" and
Eldredge told Patefield that he could "pick and choose" what
questions he wanted to answer because he (Patefield) was
"basically the boss when it c[ame] to [answering or not answering
questions]" (R. 27). The only question that Eldredge asked
Patefield was whether there were any more controlled substances
in the van, and Patefield said, u[n]o" (R. 27).
After having Patefield sit in his patrol car, Eldredge
approached defendant.

Eldredge told defendant that Patefield was

under arrest for possession of LSD.

Eldredge also specifically

told defendant that he was not under arrest but indicated that he
wanted to ask defendant some questions. While Eldredge did not
give defendant a Miranda since he had already told defendant he
was not under arrest, Eldredge did tell defendant he that did not
have to answer any questions. Defendant indicated that he
understood that he did not have to answer Eldredge's questions,
and Eldredge asked him if there was any marijuana or other
controlled substances in the van (R. 27-8).
9

Defendant did not

say anything, but he ushook his head no and shrugged his
shoulders as if to say 'no' or XI don't know'" (R. 28).
Eldredge returned to the van and looked through the other
fanny pack.

It contained some marijuana inside of a film

canister, some "zig-zag" papers, a knife and some other personal
items but no identification (R. 28). Because neither defendant
nor Patefield had claimed that fanny pack, Eldredge returned to
his patrol car and asked Patefield if it was his.

Patefield said

"[n]o" and motioned that it belonged to defendant (R. 28).
Eldredge then asked defendant if he knew who owned the fanny
pack, and defendant said he did not know who it belonged to (R.
28) .
Eldredge also found a bamboo pipe that appeared to have
marijuana residue on it in a backpack that was claimed by
defendant (R. 28-9).

Finally, Eldredge found a Tupperware bowl

full of marijuana underneath a mattress at the rear of the van
(R. 29).
Eldredge told defendant that he was not going to arrest him
but that he was going to cite him for possession of drug
paraphernalia.

Eldredge then gave Patefield the choice of either

consenting to having defendant drive his vehicle or having it
towed by a wrecker.

Patefield opted to allow defendant to drive

the van, and defendant agreed to do so (R. 29, 42). Patefield
then told Eldredge that he felt very sick and that he may have
10

"soiled his pants'' (R. 29) .
Eldredge told defendant that he would give him a citation
for possession of drug paraphernalia at the Public SafetyBuilding and took his driver's license.

He also explained that

defendant could then find out exactly how much it would cost to
bail Patefield out of jail and told defendant to follow him to
the Public Safety Building (R. 29, 30, 42).
As Eldredge took Patefield to the Public Safety Building,
defendant followed behind him "very slowly" in Patefield's van
(R. 30, 41). Indeed, at some point, Eldredge even lost sight of
defendant (R. 41). That fact did not concern Eldredge, however,
because he was not going to arrest defendant since he believed
there was insufficient evidence to connect defendant to the drugs
found in Patefield's van (R. 41-2).
By the time Eldredge and Patefield arrived at the Public
Safety Building, Eldredge was concerned about Patefield's
behavior.

Specifically, Patefield was in a "cold sweat" and was

holding his stomach as if he were sick (R. 30). Suspecting that
Patefield might be under the influence of LSD, Eldredge decided
to call Trooper Sanford Randall, a drug recognition expert who
knew more about the effects of LSD than did Eldredge. Randall
advised Eldredge to conduct some field sobriety tests (R. 3 0-1).3

3

The results of the filed sobriety tests that Eldredge
administered on Patefield do not appear on the record on appeal.
11

While waiting for defendant to arrive at the Public Safety
Building, Eldredge searched through the unclaimed fanny pack in
which he had already found some marijuana and zig-zag papers (R.
31, 42) . He found a Steamboat Springs, Colorado dog tag that was
rolled up in a zig-zag paper (R.31-33).

Eldredge not only knew

that defendant was from Steamboat Springs, he also knew defendant
had a dog because the dog was with him in the van (R. 31, 42).
When defendant arrived at the Public Safety Building,
Eldredge met him in the lobby.

Eldredge asked defendant "how

long he had owned the dog[,]" and defendant replied "around seven
years" (R. 32, 42-3) . Eldredge then told defendant that he
suspected defendant owned the fanny pack in which there was
marijuana because the pack also contained a dog tag that belonged
to defendant's dog.

Defendant did not respond to Eldredge's

comment (R. 32), and he was ultimately arrested for possession of
the marijuana (R. 4-6).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly determined that the concededly
valid stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger
reverted to a consensual encounter before the arresting officer
had any interaction with defendant.

Specifically, after Trooper

Eldredge issued a verbal warning about the burned out license
plate light and told the driver he should "get it fixed," it was
clear the traffic stop was at an end.
12

Rather than simply

proceeding on his way, the driver voluntarily elected to see if
he could fix the light immediately.

The fact that Eldredge

stayed on the scene and used his flashlight to illuminate the
area while the driver attempted to fix the light does not mean
the encounter was a continued detention for Fourth Amendment
purposes.

Rather, as the trial court recognized, Eldredge "was

just acting as any citizen would" by helping the driver replace
the faulty light (R. 78).
Eldredge's detection of the odor of alcohol on the driver's
breath, the presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with several
containers missing that -- along with a cooler -- was within
reach of the driver and passenger justified the trooper's
remaining actions. As the trial court recognized, those
collective facts gave rise to probable cause to believe there
were open containers of alcohol in the van.

Eldredge's search of

the van for open containers was therefore proper.

Once Eldredge

smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from one of two
fanny packs, his decision to search those packs and the rest of
the van for controlled substances was proper.
Finally, although defendant was the subject of a seizure for
Fourth Amendment purposes at the time he arrived at the Public
Safety Building, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
Eldredge had previously told defendant he was not under arrest
and had released the van to him so that he could drive it to the
13

sheriff's officer, thereby saving his friend the expense of
having it towed and impounded.

Defendant was never handcuffed or

asked questions that were accusatory in form or tone, and he was
not taken to an interrogation room.

The trial court's

determination that defendant was not in custody should therefore
be affirmed because it is supported by the record evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF THE VEHICLE IN WHICH DEFENDANT
WAS A PASSENGER REVERTED TO A VOLUNTARY LEVEL ONE
ENCOUNTER
In keeping with State v. Hiaains. 884 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1994),
and State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992), the trial
court properly determined that what started as a routine traffic
stop, and hence a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted
to a voluntary encounter between the driver and Trooper Eldredge
once Eldredge issued a verbal warning to the driver for having a
burned out license plate light and told him to "get it fixed" (R.
34) .4 At that point, a reasonable person would have felt free to

4

A joint hearing on both defendant's and the driver's
motions to suppress was held below (R. 19-21). That hearing was
conducted with the apparent understanding that both the driver
and defendant were seized when the van was stopped. The State
need not discuss on appeal whether defendant, a mere passenger,
was seized from the outset because any detention was plainly
justified. See Hiaains, 884 P.2d at 1244. As such, no
determination of whether defendant was seized was compelled at
trial nor is one compelled on appeal. Id. (assuming arguendo,
14

leave, and the trial court properly determined that it was the
driver who voluntarily extended the encounter by deciding he
wanted to replace the burned out light bulb while Eldredge was
present (R. 78). The fact that Eldredge assisted the driver by
illuminating the area with his flashlight in no way demonstrates
that he "stayed and created the appearance of a continued
detention and investigation" as defendant argues on appeal. Br.
of Appellant at 7.

Rather, as the trial court found, Patefield's

decision to fix the burned out light immediately was a "voluntary
act," and Eldredge "was just acting as any citizen would" by
helping Patefield replace the burned out bulb (R. 78).
In determining the limits of police conduct during a traffic
stop, courts employ a two-prong analysis: "whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether [the resulting
detention] was reasonably related [in scope] to the circumstances
that justified the interference in the first place."
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968).
v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994).

Terry v.

Accord. State

Here, the trial

court found the initial stop was justified because the license
plate light of Patefield's van was burned out, a violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 78). Defendant concedes
that point on appeal.

Br. of Appellant at 6.

Defendant argues,

but refusing to hold, that mere passenger in a stopped automobile
was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes).
15

however, that Eldredge exceeded the scope of detention and that
an "unlawful detention in this case began, most conservatively,
at the point when the trooper gave a verbal warning and did not
allow the occupants to proceed on their way."

Br. of Appellant

at 10. Defendant's assertion is based on both a misapprehension
of the facts as found by the trial court and a misapplication of
the pertinent law to the facts presented.
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that
Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes,
the seizure does not cease simply because the police
formulate an uncommunicated intention that the seized
person may go on his or her way. For the seizure to
end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from
the words of the officer or the clear import of the
circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go
about his or her business.
Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citation omitted).
In this case, Eldredge issued a verbal warning to Patefield
about the burned out licence plate light and told Patefield "to
get it fixed" (R. 23, 34). It was undisputed that Eldredge was
no longer retaining Patefield's driver's license or other
materials at that point, and Eldredge did not even run a license
or warrants check (R. 45). Patefield could have simply accepted
the trooper's warning and proceeding on his way.

Instead, after

explaining that he had just recently fixed the burned out light
and knowing that he had another replacement light bulb in his
glove compartment, Patefield decided on his own accord that he

16

wanted to fix the problem immediately.
At the suppression hearing, defendant conceded that Eldredge
did not order or command Patefield to fix the light immediately,
and the trial court found that Patefield elected to do so on his
own volition (R. 51-6).

As such, the trial court properly

determined that the encounter between Patefield and Eldredge from
that point forward was a level one, consensual police-citizen
encounter.

Cf. Castner, 825 P.2d at 705 (noting that the

defendant was no longer the subject of a Fourth Amendment seizure
where the officer had returned his driver's license, issued a
citation, and the defendant voluntarily extended the encounter by
questioning the officer about where and how to take care of the
citation and asking the officer why he had asked if there were
any weapons in his vehicle).
Defendant's claim on appeal that Eldredge "stayed and
created the appearance of a continued detention and investigation
[by] shadow[ing] Patefield as he attempted to fix the licence
plate light and get tools [from his van]" (Br. of Appellant at 7)
is an attempt to alter the facts as found by the trial court
without saddling the burden of showing that court's findings were
clearly erroneous.

It was the trial court's prerogative to make

findings about the nature and character of the interaction
between Eldredge and Patefield.

The thrust of the trial court's

ruling evidences its determination that the encounter was not
17

confrontational or hostile but was instead cooperative and
friendly in nature.

Eldredge merely assisted Patefield by

illuminating the area with his flashlight while Patefield
attempted to replace the burned out bulb during the darkness of
night on the side of the highway.
Certainly, Eldredge could also have simply hopped in his
patrol car and left Patefield to his own devices.

But, as the

trial court suggested, that is not what most citizens in
Eldredge's position would have done (R. 78). Instead, most
citizens would have stayed and helped Patefield, and we should
expect at least that much if not more from members of our law
enforcement community.
In light of the facts as found by the trial court, "the
words of [Trooper Eldredge and] the clear import of the
circumstances" would have made clear to a reasonable person in
Patefield's position that they were uat liberty free to go about
[their] business."

Higgins. 884 P.2d at 1244. The trial court's

conclusion that the level two traffic stop reverted to a level
one encounter should therefore be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ELDREDGE HAD
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH PATEFIELD'S VAN FOR OPEN
CONTAINERS OF ALCOHOL
The trial court properly determined that the facts known to
Eldredge at the time he searched Patefield's van provided
18

probable cause to believe there were open containers of alcohol
in the van.

This Court reviews ua trial court's determination of

whether a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of
discretion to the trial court."

State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220,

225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, this

Court "does not conduct a close, de novo review of the trial
court's probable cause determination; rather, [it] review[s] the
placement of the legal fences which delimit the pasture of trail
court discretion to determine what constitutes probable cause."
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

So

reviewed, the facts presented to the trial court established
probable cause.
Determinations of whether probable cause exists require a
common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances
confronting the officer at the time of the search.
Dorsey. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986).

State v.

The facts need not

demonstrate with certainty that incriminating evidence will be
discovered:
In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are factual and practical
considerations of every day life on which reasonable
and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what
must be proved.
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Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949)).

Because probable

cause does not require certainty, "[t]he line between 'mere
suspicion and probable cause . . . necessarily must be drawn by
an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular
situation and with account taken of all the circumstances.'" Id.
(quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S. Ct. at 1311).
Courts must also be mindful of the degree of proof required
to move an officer's belief to the level of probable cause.
Probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found[;]" that "requires only a . . .
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of
such activity."
n.13 (1983).

Illinois V, Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243,44

As such, "[t]he quantum of evidence needed for

probable cause is significantly less than that needed to prove
guilt" Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 226 (citation omitted), and it "does
not require more that a rationally based conclusion of
probability[.]" Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1088. Rather, "probable cause
is only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity." Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 227 (citations
omitted).
In this case, Eldredge had more that a mere suspicion that
Patefield's van contained evidence of a crime. As the trial
court implicitly recognized, the information known to Eldredge at
20

the time of the search would have prompted a "prudent,
reasonable, cautious police officer" to conclude that there was a
"substantial chance'' the van contained open containers of
alcohol.
While defendant properly notes that Eldredge based his
probable cause assessment on the fact that Patefield had alcohol
on his breath and that the van contained an open 12-pack from
which several containers were missing, defendant is wrong when he
asserts that "no other factors" supported Eldredge's suspicion of
open containers.

Br. of Appellant at 10-11.5

Specifically, the

reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that the
open 12-pack of beer and the coolers were within defendant's and
Patefield's reach because they were behind the front seat and by
the sliding door that opened on the side of the van.

That much

can be inferred from the fact that Eldredge, who searched the van
through the open sliding door, had to "lean over the coolers" as
he reached across to the other side of the van to lift up the
blankets and clothes that were "directly behind the driver's
seat." (R. 24-5) .

5

Defendant's assertion ignores the fact that, while the
trial court focused primarily on the odor of alcohol and presence
of 12-packs of beer (one of which was opened), the trial court
made clear that those two facts had to be considered "in view of
all the circumstances" (R. 79).
21

Under the totality of the circumstances, while Eldredge
candidly acknowledged that he did not suspect Patefield was
impaired, it was reasonable for him to suspect that Patefield may
have recently had a drink of beer and that the open beer
container was still in the van.

It may have been stashed behind

the driver's seat where Eldredge looked first, or it might have
been in one of the coolers.
The fact that Eldredge's suspicion about an open container
proved wrong does not mean that the trial court's finding of
probable cause was in error.

Rather, as the trial court

implicitly recognized (R. 81), a finding of probable cause is not
defeated simply because an officer's belief proves wrong:
Because many situations which confront officers in the
course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on
their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable [persons], acting on facts leading sensibly
to their conclusions of probability. The rule of
probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at
the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.
SpurgeOH, 904 P.2d at 226 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69
S. Ct. at 1311).
Here, the odor of alcohol on Patefield's breath, the
presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with approximately half of
the containers missing, and coolers in which cold beer might have
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been stored within Patefield's and defendant's reach,
collectively suggest that there was a ''substantial chance" that
Patefield had an open container of beer in his van.

The trial

court's finding of probable cause should therefore be affirmed.6

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT WAS
NOT IN CUSTODY FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES
The record provides ample support for the trial court's
determination that defendant was not in custody when he arrived
at the lobby of the Public Safety Building.

Nevertheless, while

not attacking the trial court's factual determinations, defendant
contends he was in custody under the test articulated in State v.
Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), pet.
pending.

for

rehearing

As demonstrated below, defendant's reliance on Mirquet

is misplaced.
Under Mirquet. the determination of whether a suspect who
has not been formally arrested is in custody for Miranda purposes
is guided by consideration of, among other things, (1) the site
of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on
the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were

6

With respect to defendant's exigent circumstances
argument, this Court need only recognize that Patefield's van was
stopped on a public highway. Assuming the establishment of
probable cause, it was therefore subject to a warrantless search
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. State
v. Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18 (Utah 1996).
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present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.
268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4.

Mirquet.

In Mirquet. all of these factors

weighed in favor of finding defendant was in custody.
In Mirquet. the defendant was seated in a police car to
receive a speeding ticket when the arresting officer raised the
totally unrelated issue of marijuana use by telling the
defendant: "It's obvious to me you've been smoking marijuana.
You know, there's no doubt in my mind.

Would you like to go to

the car and get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get it?"
Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3.

The Supreme Court

characterized the officer's accusatory questioning as "a virtual
command . . . to retrieve evidence of a crime that was clearly
incriminating."

Id. at 5.

This case is plainly distinguishable from Mirquet. Here, the
trial court found that, while defendant was seized insofar as he
needed to come to the sheriff's office to get his citation,
defendant "freely" decided to drive Patefield's van to the Public
Safety Building in order to save Patefield the cost of having it
towed and impounded (R. 81-82).

Upon his arrival, defendant was

neither handcuffed nor taken to an interrogation room; rather,
Eldredge met him in the lobby (R. 32, 42-3, 82) . Eldredge asked
defendant a single question(how long had defendant owned his dog)
that was not "an accusatory question" (R. 82). Finally, Eldredge
had previously made clear to defendant that, while he was going
24

to be cited for possession of drug paraphernalia, only Patefield
was under arrest (R. 27-30), which is why defendant was permitted
to drive Patefield's van.

In sum, none of the indicia of arrest

were present, defendant's freedom of movement was essentially
unrestricted, the "interrogation" consisted of but one nonaccusatory question, and defendant had previously been told that
he was not going to be arrested.

The mere fact that the question

was asked of defendant while he was at the Public Safety Building
does not compel the conclusion that defendant was in custody.
Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5.

The trial court's

determination that defendant was not in custody for Miranda
purposes should therefore be affirmed.
STATEMENT REQAfrPINg NEED FOR QRAL ARGUMENT
AND pgglfrABIfrlTY QF QFFICIAL PUBLICATION
The facts of this case are straightforward, and the legal
doctrines at issue are well established.

The State therefore

does not request oral argument or the issuance of an opinion
designated nFor Official Publication."
In the event this Court decides to schedule oral argument in
either this case or in co-defendant Patefield's case, State v.
Patefield, No. 950736-CA, then oral argument should be granted in
both cases.
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CONCISION
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's convictions
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / ^ d a y of March, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

TODD A. UTZINGI
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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ADDENDUM A
Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Findings of Fact and
Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress
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1

was still something that —

that was something the officer

2

was entitled to do*

3

the law here, which the officer had the right to cite or see]

4

corrected on the spot.

5

it that way and that's why he felt compelled to walk to the

6

back of the car, that was something that was perfectly

7

permissible as well.

8

level 2 citizen-police encounter with no expanded scope,

9

that is, the scope is the license plate light period.

There was, after all, a violation of

And, so if Mr. Patefield understood

It just meant that it remained at a

So,

10

whether it was a level 1 or level 2 stop at the time where

11

he smelled the —

12

Patefield's breath, the officer had the right to be there.

13

And, he smelled the odor of alcohol on Mr. Patefield's

14

breath.

15

observed these cartons, these twelve packs of beer, one of

16

which had been opened and containers from which were

17

missing.

18

worth addressing is whether the probable —

19

combination of those things taken in view of all the

20

circumstances, these twelve packs of beer, one of which had

21

clearly been opened and from which containers were missing

22

combined with the odor of alcohol on a driver's breath,

23

whether those combined make it more likely than not that

24

there will be —

25

container in the vehicle or that there has been someone in

the officer smelled the alcohol on Mr.

He had, also, being where he had every right to be,

And, really the only question I think in this case]
whether the

that this individual has had an open

Jane Musselrnan
tiffed Court Transcriber
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So

1

the vehicle.

I think there would be.

I think —

In this

2

case, it turned out that there wasn't.

3

than fifty-one cases out of a hundred, you would — you

4

would find an open container of alcohol with this

5

combination of circumstances.

6

there was probable cause to search this vehicle for open

7

containers. And, in the process of that search, the officer]

8

looked in one of the most likely places, right behind the

9

driver's seat, and in that process smelled the odor of

But, I think more

For that reason, I find that

10

marijuana, which then gave, under the (inaudible) probable

11

cause, to search for marijuana.

12

marijuana, and once he found that, other drugs.

13

He was able to search for

The question of Mr. Wiley's statement in response to a

14

question, I find that that was interrogation because the

15

officer by this time had seen the dog tag.

16

isn't it?

17

asking that question not just out of ideal curiosity, but —I

18

not to pass the time of day, but to connect Mr. Wiley to the}

19

dog tag, which tied him to the fanny pack in which the

20

marijuana was located.

21

there is whether. Mr. Wiley was in custody.

22

believe Mr. Wiley was in custody.

23

circumstances of this case, I believe Mr. Wiley was acting

24

to help Mr. Patefield out —

25

impoundment of his vehicle and was simply driving up to the

That's right

By this time he had seen the dog tag, so he was

The other prong of the analysis
And I don't

From all the facts and

helping Mr. Patefield avoid
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1

he could use it to write out the citation.

2

that Mr. Wiley was going to need to come to the Public

3

Safety Building in order to get his citation and his license]

4

back.
MS REILLY:

5

But, it did meaq

Your Honor, with respect to this

6

matter and in light of the court's ruling, we wish to enter

7

conditional pleas of guilty at this time and ask the court

8

accept the conditional pleas, because we intend to notice ofl

9

appeal on this matter.

And, also, I would ask in advance if]

10

the court would stay the sentence pending appeal. I

11

understand that Mr. Wiley has a bail.

12

that's already set up.

13
14

I'm advised —

a bail]

THE COURT: Are you agreeing to a conditional
plea here, Mr. Halls?

15

MR. HALLS: Well, I was just trying to run

16

through it in my mind.

17

matter and spend a couple of days, then they can still

18

appeal it on the same issue.

19

anything by not agreeing to conditional —

20

pleas.

21

charged, they can appeal it back to the trial anyway, so I

22

guess I really don't have any objection to it.

If we go through a trial in the

So, I'm not sure I gain

If they're going to plead to the —

conditional
to this as

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MS REILLY:

Do you wish us to come forward,

25

Your Honor?
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